In the debate over the moral status of nonsentient organisms, biocentrists argue that all living things, including nonsentient ones, have interests of their own. They often defend this claim by arguing that living organisms are goal-directed, functionally organized systems. This argument for ascribing interests has faced a serious challenge that is sometimes called the Problem of Scope. Critics have argued that ascribing interests on the basis of functional organization would have implausible implications regarding the scope of the argument, such as (...) ascribing interests to inanimate artifacts and machines. In this paper, I argue that much of the recent discussion on the Problem of Scope is based on an uncharitable interpretation of the argument for ascribing interests, which presupposes a reductionist account of functions. I assess this version of the argument, and explain why it cannot succeed. I then consider an alternative interpretation of the argument, which starts from a non-reductionist account of functions. I argue that this version of the argument avoids the Problem of Scope, while acknowledging that it has limitations of its own. (shrink)

This paper addresses a question about the moral status of Artificial Intelligence (AI): will AIs ever become moral patients? I argue that, while it is in principle possible for an intelligent machine to be a moral patient, there is no good reason to believe this will in fact happen. I start from the plausible assumption that traditional artifacts do not meet a minimal necessary condition of moral patiency: having a good of one's own. I then argue that intelligent machines are (...) no different from traditional artifacts in this respect. To make this argument, I examine the feature of AIs that enables them to improve their intelligence, i.e., machine learning. I argue that there is no reason to believe that future advances in machine learning will take AIs closer to having a good of their own. I thus argue that concerns about the moral status of future AIs are unwarranted. Nothing about the nature of intelligent machines makes them a better candidate for acquiring moral patiency than the traditional artifacts whose moral status does not concern us. (shrink)

Neo‐Aristotelian ethical naturalism purports to show that moral evaluation of human action and character is an evaluation of natural goodness—a kind of evaluation that applies to living things in virtue of their nature and based on their form of life. The standard neo‐Aristotelian view defines natural goodness by way of generic statements describing the natural history, or the ‘characteristic’ life, of a species. In this paper, I argue that this conception of natural goodness commits the neo‐Aristotelian view to a problematic (...) anti‐individualism that results in the wrong assessment of individuals with uniquely adaptive adjustments. I then offer an alternative account of natural goodness that avoids this problem. Instead of relying on generic statements about a species, my account defines natural goodness based on counterfactual conditionals describing the modal properties of a single individual. I argue that this modal‐explanatory account gives a conception of natural goodness that is more intuitively plausible and better suited to capture the diversity and plasticity distinctive of life. (shrink)

Neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism aims to place moral virtue in the natural world by showing that moral goodness is an instance of natural goodness—a kind of goodness supposedly also found in the biological realm of plants and non-human animals. One of the central issues facing neo-Aristotelian naturalists concerns their commitment to a kind of function ascription based on the concept of the flourishing of an organism that seems to have no place in modern biology. In this paper, I offer a novel (...) defense of this functional commitment by appealing to the organizational account of biological function. I argue that the flourishing-based concept of function that forms the basis of the neo-Aristotelian account of natural goodness is explanatorily indispensable to biology, and therefore essential to the understanding of living things. (shrink)

Neo-Aristotelian metaethical naturalism is a modern attempt at naturalizing ethics using ideas from Aristotle’s teleological metaphysics. Proponents of this view argue that moral virtue in human beings is an instance of natural goodness, a kind of goodness supposedly also found in the realm of non-human living things. Many critics question whether neo-Aristotelian naturalism is tenable in light of modern evolutionary biology. Two influential lines of objection have appealed to an evolutionary understanding of human nature and natural teleology to argue against (...) this view. In this paper, I offer a reconstruction of these two seemingly different lines of objection as raising instances of the same dilemma, giving neo-Aristotelians a choice between contradicting our considered moral judgment and abandoning metaethical naturalism. I argue that resolving the dilemma requires showing a particular kind of continuity between the norms of moral virtue and norms that are necessary for understanding non-human living things. I also argue that in order to show such a continuity, neo-Aristotelians need to revise the relationship they adopt with empirical science and acknowledge that the latter is relevant to assessing their central commitments regarding living things. Finally, I argue that to move this debate forward, both neo-Aristotelians and their critics should pay attention to recent work on the concept of organism in evolutionary and developmental biology. (shrink)

In this work, we introduce a new non-Shilnikov chaotic system with an infinite number of nonhyperbolic equilibrium points. The proposed system does not have any linear term, and it is worth noting that the new system has one equilibrium point with triple zero eigenvalues at the origin. Also, the novel system has an infinite number of equilibrium points with double zero eigenvalues that are located on the z -axis. Numerical analysis of the system reveals many strong dynamics. The new system (...) exhibits multistability and antimonotonicity. Multistability implies the coexistence of many periodic, limit cycle, and chaotic attractors under different initial values. Also, bifurcation analysis of the system shows interesting phenomena such as periodic window, period-doubling route to chaos, and inverse period-doubling bifurcations. Moreover, the complexity of the system is analyzed by computing spectral entropy. The spectral entropy distribution under different initial values is very scattered and shows that the new system has numerous multiple attractors. Finally, chaos-based encoding/decoding algorithms for secure data transmission are developed by designing a state chain diagram, which indicates the applicability of the new chaotic system. (shrink)

Neo-Aristotelian naturalism purports to explain morality in terms of human nature, while maintaining that the relevant aspects of human nature cannot be known scientifically. This has led some to conclude that neo-Aristotelian naturalism is not a form of ethical naturalism in the standard, metaphysical sense. In this paper, I argue that neo-Aristotelian naturalism is in fact a standard form of ethical naturalism that is committed to metaphysical naturalism about moral truths and presents a distinctive and underappreciated argument for it. I (...) reconstruct the neo-Aristotelian argument for ethical naturalism in terms of a continuity between the ethical domain and the natural domain of life. I argue that clarifying the meta-ethical import of neo-Aristotelian naturalism not only helps to situate it among other positions in meta-ethics, but also facilitates better critical engagement with the view. (shrink)

Recent developments in the field of education have led to a renewed interest in the mediating role of critical thinking abilities in the relationship between language learning strategies and the intermediate English as a Foreign Language learners’ writing performance. Oxford Placement Test was run to homogenize the participants, and 100 intermediate learners out of 235 were selected. Then, two valid questionnaires of Ricketts’ Critical Thinking Disposition and Oxford’s Strategy Inventory for Language Learning were administered. Having administered the questionnaires, the researchers (...) asked the participants to sit for a writing test. The data collected from the questionnaires and as well as the scores of their writing performances were analyzed through SPSS. The results showed a significant relationship between learning strategies and learners’ writing performances, the sub-sets of learning strategies and learners’ writing performances, and CTA and learners’ learning strategies. However, CTA did not play a mediating role in the relationship between intermediate EFL learners’ learning strategies and writing performance. Based on the results of the study, one might also conclude that strategies seemed to play a more important role in the performance of learners especially their writing performances. Therefore, this study had useful contributions for students, teachers, and curriculum designers. Findings of this research could assist teachers to be aware of learners’ strategies in learning writing and help their students to be responsive to using learning strategies in their learning process and create a satisfactory learning context for using learning strategies. Therefore, learners were able to become independent and feel responsibility for their own learning. Secondly, curriculum developers could take advantage of the findings to include learning strategies training into the curriculum. As a result, students were able to use strategies in their learning process more easily and finally, the results might pave the way for improving the research findings. (shrink)

According to neo-Aristotelian ethical naturalism, moral goodness is an instance of natural goodness, a kind of normativity supposedly already present in nature in the biological realm of non-human living things. Proponents of this view appeal to Michael Thompson’s conception of a life-form--the form of a living organism--to give an account of natural goodness. However, although neo-Aristotelians call themselves naturalists, they hardly ever consult the science of biology to defend their commitments regarding biological organisms. This has led many critics to argue (...) that the neo-Aristotelian account of natural normativity is out of touch with the findings of modern evolutionary biology. One line of response to this objection, presented by John Hacker-Wright and Micah Lott, claims that the neo-Aristotelian concept of a living organism has to be presupposed in evolutionary biology as long as organisms are the subjects of evolutionary explanation. In this paper, I examine this response by tracing the concept of organism in modern evolutionary biology. I first argue that the Modern Synthesis theory of evolution, which understands evolution as change in gene frequencies within a population, does not presuppose the relevant concept of organism. I then explore an alternative view of evolution that has emerged in the past twenty years from advances in evolutionary developmental biology. I argue that this so called ‘evo-devo’ approach makes room for an explanatory concept of organism that can be reconciled with the neo-Aristotelian view. Moreover, I argue that although the explanatory role of the concept of organism in evolutionary biology is still contentious, the well-established role of this concept in developmental biology can be used to defend the biological commitments of neo-Aristotelian naturalism. (shrink)

Molecular methods have revolutionised virtually every area of biology, and metazoan phylogenetics is no exception: molecular phylogenies, molecular clocks, comparative phylogenomics, and developmental genetics have generated a plethora of molecular data spanning numerous taxa and collectively transformed our understanding of the evolutionary history of animals, often corroborating but at times opposing results of more traditional approaches. Moreover, the diversity of methods and models within molecular phylogenetics has resulted in significant disagreement among molecular phylogenies as well as between these and earlier (...) phylogenies. How should this broad and multifaceted problem be tackled? I argue that the answer lies in integrating evidence to infer the best evolutionary scenario. I begin with an overview of recent development in early metazoan phylogenetics, followed by a discussion of key conceptual issues in phylogenetics revolving around phylogenetic evidence, theory, methodology, and interrelations thereof. I then argue that the integration of different kinds of evidence is necessary for arriving at the best evolutionary scenario rather than merely the best-fitting cladogram. Finally, I discuss the prospects of this view in stimulating interdisciplinary cross-talk in early metazoan research and beyond, and challenges that need to be overcome. (shrink)

We explain here how the natural selection theory of people's mutualistic sense of fairness and the biofunctional theory of human understanding are made for each other. We welcome the stage that the target article has already set for this convergence, and invite the authors to consider moving the two independently developed approaches a step closer to the natural selection level of biofunctional understanding.

The structure of everyday language implies that knowledge is an object. Like an object, it can be acquired, lost, stored, retrieved, and used. Anything that might be done to an external object could also be done to knowledge. Using concepts from the emerging field of biofunctional cognition, this paper discusses an alternative to the everyday-language framework of knowledge. The central idea is that the biological subsystems that comprise the physical nervous system have the capacity to create in us a live, (...) as opposed to pre-recorded, experience that might be described as intuitive self-awareness. In its various manifestations, this ongoing intuitive self-awareness is what we recognize as the knowledge inside us. There is no storage of knowledge of any kind. Intuitive self-awareness is in a perpetual state of re-creation and change. It serves as a private language with which the individual interacts directly with the subsystems of his/her own nervous system. This is the primary function of intuitive self-awareness &emdash; serving as the vehicle for the private communication between the individual and the individual's nervous system. Intuitive self-awareness has also come to serve, through evolutionary symbolic adaptation, as the foundation for the public language that the individual uses to communicate with other individuals. This is the secondary function of the intuitive self-awareness &emdash; to serve as the vehicle for public communication within social groups in which the individual lives. In this function, intuitive self-awareness externalizes to manifest itself in the form of an indirect code system for public communication. The nonsymbolic and symbolic forms of knowledge enable the organism to extend its internal world to encompass the external world in both its totality and detail. (shrink)

Neo-Aristotelian metaethical naturalism aims to naturalize ethical normativity by showing that it is continuous with natural normativity, a kind of normativity already present in nature among plants and animals. Opponents of this view argue that evolutionary biology rejects the neo-Aristotelian notion of natural normativity, while its proponents argue that the opponents’ appeal to evolutionary biology is misguided and misses the point of the metaethical project. In this paper, I first argue that evolutionary biology is in fact relevant for assessing the (...) naturalistic credentials of neo-Aristotelian naturalism, which raises the question what biology tells us about this view. I then argue that far from being obvious that evolutionary biology rejects this view, there is an understanding of evolution within philosophy of biology, which is congenial to the neo-Aristotelian notion of natural normativity. (shrink)

Reconstructing ancestral species is a challenging endeavour: fossils are often scarce or enigmatic, and inferring ancestral characters based on novel molecular approaches has long been controversial. A key philosophical challenge pertinent at present is the lack of a theoretical framework capable of evaluating inferences of homology made through integration of multiple kinds of evidence. Here, I present just such a framework. I start with a brief history and critical assessment of attempts at inferring morphological homology through developmental genetics. I then (...) bring attention to a recent model of homology, namely Character Identity Mechanisms, intended partly to elucidate the relationships between morphological characters, developmental genetics, and homology. I utilise and build on this model to construct the evaluative framework mentioned above, which judges the epistemic value of evidence of each kind in each particular case based on three proposed criteria: effectiveness, admissibility, and informativity, as well as providing a generalised guideline on how it can be scientifically operationalised. I then point out the evolution of the eumetazoan body plan as a case in point where the application of this framework can yield satisfactory results, both empirically and conceptually. I will conclude with a discussion on some potential implications for more general philosophy of biology and philosophy of science, especially surrounding evidential integration, models and explanation, and reductionism. (shrink)

Brain monitoring combined with automatic analysis of EEGs provides a clinical decision support tool that can reduce time to diagnosis and assist clinicians in real-time monitoring applications (e.g., neurological intensive care units). Clinicians have indicated that a sensitivity of 95% with specificity below 5% was the minimum requirement for clinical acceptance. In this study, a high-performance automated EEG analysis system based on principles of machine learning and big data is proposed. This hybrid architecture integrates hidden Markov models (HMMs) for sequential (...) decoding of EEG events with deep learning-based postprocessing that incorporates temporal and spatial context. These algorithms are trained and evaluated using the Temple University Hospital EEG, which is the largest publicly available corpus of clinical EEG recordings in the world. This system automatically processes EEG records and classifies three patterns of clinical interest in brain activity that might be useful in diagnosing brain disorders: (1) spike and/or sharp waves, (2) generalized periodic epileptiform discharges, (3) periodic lateralized epileptiform discharges. It also classifies three patterns used to model the background EEG activity: (1) eye movement, (2) artifacts and (3) background. Our approach delivers a sensitivity above 90% while maintaining a specificity below 5%. We also demonstrate that this system delivers a low false alarm rate, which is critical for any spike detection application. (shrink)

Although Bartlett's schema theory has been highly influential in modern cognitive psychology, it has often been misunderstood. This paper discusses Bartlett's schema theory along with modern schema theories, argues that the problems in the interpretation of Bartlett's writing arise because his theory is fundamentally different from modern schema theories, shows that Bartlett's theory, but not modern schema theories, can be explained in terms of the brain's constructive and self-regulatory processes, and discusses such a brain-based theory of learning and remembering in (...) the context of recent developments in biofunctional cognition. (shrink)

Researchers have held different views on what role the nervous system should play in the study of psychological phenomena. By far, the most informative line of research in the area has been conducted by Lashley whose work has opened our eyes to the possibility that learning and remembering are unexplainable in terms of the storage and retrieval of specific traces. However, with this exception, the twentieth century is likely to be remembered as an era during which the brain has been (...) considered irrelevant for the study of the mind. This has certainly been the case with the research following the computer-inspired cognitive revolution. Perhaps the most revealing indication of the degree of reluctance to embrace the brain in the study of the mind can be found in the so-called brain-inspired connectionism that purports to use the brain as a metaphor, and not as the literal foundation it really is, for the structure of cognition. Focusing on the topics of learning and remembering, this paper discusses the role of the brain in the research of Lashley, brain-inspired connectionism, and the emerging field of biofunctional cognition. The hope is to illustrate, through biofunctional cognition, the productive nature of basing psychological thinking on the foundation of a comprehensive theory of the functioning of the nervous system. (shrink)